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Since coming to power in 2000, Russian president Vladimir Putin has tried to construct a 
narrative of regaining Russia’s status as a major global power. However, in practice the 
Kremlin is yet to have created a coherent strategy or to have achieved a sense of coordination 
in foreign policy. While North Africa has not been at the forefront of this narrative, recently 
Moscow has intensified its diplomatic links and cooperation with the regimes in the region. 
The Arab Spring presented Russian policy-makers with a series of challenges regarding the 
uncertainty of the developments in the region, but also with renewed economic opportunities. 
This profile analyses Moscow’s relationships with the countries in North Africa (Libya, 
Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria) in the wake of the Arab Spring. In each case the 
Kremlin aimed to take advantage of the new opportunities without really being guided by an 
overarching strategy for the region. However, Russia increasingly seems to be keen to 









The current crisis in Ukraine has put the spotlight on Russian foreign policy. This has 
involved questioning the factors which influence Moscow’s foreign policy, together with the 
instruments it uses to pursue its goals. Much of this attention has focused on the way in which 
Russia is trying to regain its former hegemony in the post-Soviet space. More generally 
though, Russia has constructed a multi-vector foreign policy, in that it has focused 
simultaneously on various vectors (loosely defined regions – e.g. the Transatlantic, Eurasian 
or the Oriental one). Since Putin came to power in 2000, the development of a long term-
strategy has not been one of the cornerstones of this multi-vector foreign policy, as vectors 
have changed many times. Recently, the southern Mediterranean has become such a vector 
due to its increasing importance in economic terms for Russian foreign policy. Yet, Russia’s 
approach towards the region is influenced by the overall lack of strategy in Russian foreign 
policy, but also Moscow’s fear of the Arab world, or its willingness to support some regimes 
in the region that oppose western influences whilst also collaborating with the US and the EU 
in order to combat Islamic extremism. It is of particular relevance here that in Russian foreign 
policy the southern Mediterranean is mainly circumscribed to parts of the Mashreq and North 
Africa. Moreover, in contrast to the EU or the US, both of which have aimed to build 
comprehensive strategies for the region, Moscow has preferred to deal bilaterally with the 
states in the region (or ad-hoc groups of states).  
The Arab Spring and the popular uprisings that unfolded puzzled Russian policy-makers 
considerably and made them fear that events might spill-over to the post-Soviet space and to 
Russia and the North Caucasus in particular. To this end, this profile explores Moscow’s 
approach towards the southern Mediterranean in the wake of the Arab Spring. Rather than 
looking at the region as a whole, it draws on Russia’s approach and analyses recent and rather 
overlooked developments in its bilateral relations with the countries of North Africa, such as 
Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. Before engaging in the country specific analysis, 
the profile first looks briefly at the complex nature of policy-making in Russian foreign policy 
in general and will then conclude by synthesizing some of the findings and also offer insights 
into how Moscow’s approach towards the region might evolve in the future.  It finds that the 
Kremlin seems keen to take advantage of new opportunities offered by the Arab Spring. 
However, if Russia is to be successful in its efforts it should devise an overarching approach 
towards the region rather than focusing solely on bilateral relations.   
 
Russian foreign policy under Putin 
The absence of a coherent strategy in Russian foreign policy is predicated upon the power 
struggle between various groups. These groups support different vectors according to their 
interests and ideas about Russia’s role in international relations. Policy-makers in foreign 
policy have grouped according to their willingness to collaborate with the West, their 
preference to be treated as an equal by the US or the EU, or the desire to promote (or impose) 
a Russian understanding of international relations globally. Putin’s goal has been to try to 
centralize Russian foreign policy and instil a sense of coordination and strategy. This strategy 
is seen to be crucial for pursuing effectively Russia’s global interests. It entails the creation 
and promotion of a narrative which emphasizes Russia’s return to the status of a major global 
power which does not only have to be treated as an equal by Europe or the US, but also to be 
able to project its own values globally. The 2008 Russian-Georgian war, Russia’s 
involvement in Ukraine or its increasing claims over the Artic stand out as practical 
manifestations of this narrative. Moreover, Putin has banked on his achievements and 
ambitions in foreign policy in order to strengthen his domestic support in the context of 
increasing contestation of his legitimacy in the Russian public sphere. Consequently, 
internally he has emphasized continuity (or a commonly shared ‘civilizing ‘mission) between 
the global ethos of imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. For example, across Russia statues 
of Lenin stand next to statues resurrected from the Tsarist era.  
The extent to which Putin’s efforts have been successful is very questionable, but Russia’s 
approach to the crisis in Ukraine or the development of the Eurasian Union are evidence of an 
emerging pattern of coordination in Russia’s approach towards the post-Soviet space. Other 
regions, such as North Africa are yet to receive this level of attention from Putin, and have not 
been directly linked to the narrative of continuity and great power revival. Moscow’s 
approach towards them is still very much influenced by the various interests of the groups in 
Russian foreign policy. What this all points to, is the decentralized, ad-hoc and bilateral nature 
of Russia’s engagement with countries in the southern Mediterranean. Russia’s involvement 
in this region is informed mostly by economic interests such as energy relations and the 
increasing penetration of the region in this area by Russian companies, but also in regards to 
arms trade where Russia is seeking to re-discover, maintain or even enlarge its Cold War 
markets. During the Cold War the North African countries were caught in between the 
influence of the US and the Soviet Union. Some of these states experienced alternating 
periods of Soviet and American influence: for example, Egypt leaned first in the 50s and 60s 
towards the Soviet Union, and then reversed its policy aligning to the US in the 70s.  Both 
superpowers aimed to establish a foothold in the region, whilst also pursuing their own 
economic interests – for the Soviet Union this involved mainly securing and enhancing 
markets for its military industry. These relations have carried on after the break-up of the 
Soviet Union and have even been strengthened since Putin came to power. 
The Arab Spring created significant losses to the Russian military and defence industry due to 
the breakdown of several defence contracts (of around 10 billion dollars), making Moscow 
less willing than the US or the EU to support revolutionary forces that bring about change in 
the region. The Kremlin also perceived the overthrow of autocratic (and rather stable) regimes 
as a threat to regional stability. On the other hand, the Arab Spring raised important questions 
for Russia’s foreign policy regarding the contagion of radical Islam, terrorism and public 
uprisings in North Africa and their possible spill-over to the post-Soviet space or its own 
territory. These concerns stem from the lack of understanding of the Muslim world together 
with Moscow’s fear that predominantly Muslim areas on its territory might try to gain 
independence. The next section builds on these insights into Russian foreign policy and 
analyses its bilateral engagement in North Africa.  
 
Russia’s bilateral engagement in North Africa 
Libya - from partner to stranger?  
After the suspension of international sanctions in April 1999 and their subsequent lifting by 
the UN Security Council in September 2004, Libya aligned itself increasingly with the West, 
mainly as a result of mere power considerations and the notion that such a move would ensure 
the survival of Qaddafi’s regime. In parallel, Russia worked towards resuming its close 
economic ties that had existed for almost two decades up until the early nineties, hoping that it 
could re-establish itself as Libya’s main arms supplier. Putin, to date the only Russian 
president that ever visited Libya, went to Tripoli in April 2008 and in exchange of writing-off 
approx. $4.5 billion that Libya had owed to Russia, signed, or agreed in principle on, 
numerous contracts over economic, technical, and military cooperation supposedly worth $10 
billion. As a result of Qaddafi’s further intensification of economic and diplomatic relations 
with the US, the United Kingdom and France, Russia was however unable to capitalize on 
these contracts, and Putin’s and Gazprom’s strategic objective, i.e. to purchase all Libyan oil 
and gas, thus exerting effective control of Libyan hydrocarbon supplies to Europe and EU 
member states, never materialized. 
The prospect of controlling all Libyan energy supplies has become even more unlikely as 
Russia throughout the last three years failed to shake off its image as a counter-revolutionary 
force and long-standing supporter of the Qaddafi regime. Interestingly, this notion persisted 
among both members of the National Transition Council (NTC), armed militia and the 
General National Congress (GNC) in spite of Russia’s abstention to provide coherent support 
to Qaddafi forces in the context of the Libyan civil war. In fact, while Russia abstained from 
approving UN Security Council resolution 1973 in March 2011, then President Medvedev in 
May 2011 even declared that Qaddafi had lost his legitimacy and should resign. The reason 
why such announcements were, however, insufficient to break with perceptional patterns was 
that they reflected the stance of only one faction inside the Kremlin which also boasted 
alternative, yet powerful voices. Putin and foreign minister Lavrov for example considered 
any external involvement in Libya as a breach of Libya’s sovereignty and therefore strongly 
opposed the decision by the UN panel of experts on Libya on 20 March 2011 that arms 
supplies were, in fact, under certain conditions compatible with UNSC resolution 1973. 
Unsurprisingly, such fragmented views did not resonate well with Libyans in general and 
neither did Russian accusations claiming that the Libyan authorities hosted training facilities 
for foreign fighters engaged in overthrowing Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. In conjunction 
with repeated announcements in 2012 and 2013 by the NTC that countries that participated in 
the NATO-led military campaign against the Qaddafi regime should be rewarded with 
preferential treatment, these factors accelerated considerably the trend, already visible since 
1999, of a dwindling Russian presence in Libya. This is exemplified by the fact that up until 
the outbreak of renewed violence in mid-2014 and the subsequent evacuation of the Russian 
embassy staff in August 2014, Gazprom was unsuccessful in securing a much envisaged stake 
in the ENI-led Elephant oil field 800 km south of Tripoli. Similarly, Rosoboronexport, 
Russia’s state agency in charge of arms exports, did not manage to revive existing arms 
contracts or secure new ones, and also Russian infrastructure companies, such as Russian 
Railways (RZhD), supposedly participating in a Chinese-led consortium destined to construct 
a 554km railway line between the cities of Benghazi and Sirte, were unable to compete with 
other, mainly US and western European corporations.  
 
Egypt – new opportunities, new honeymoon?  
While Russia failed to capitalize in Libya on the US’ relative retreat from the Middle East in 
general, the military coup of 3 July 2013 in Egypt offered Russia new avenues to achieve 
several objectives at the same time. In fact, the current and rather rapidly evolving 
rapprochement between Russia and Egypt is seen by many in Moscow as an opportunity to 
project the Kremlin’s global aspirations and to drive a wedge between Cairo and Washington. 
Yet, the warming of relations is not the result of a pro-active strategy on the part of Russia, 
but occurs mainly in response to global re-balancing efforts by the Egyptian regime of 
president Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, Egyptian ambitions to pursue a more multi-dimensional, 
independent and pro-active foreign policy, and the regime’s attempts to exploit the power 
rivalry between the US and Russia, not least in light of the Ukraine crisis.  
Whereas Egypt already in recent pre-Arab Spring times occasionally half-heartedly flirted 
with Russia, current advances, numerous high-level meetings, and the conclusion of several 
wide-ranging agreements indicate the emergence of a true partnership of convenience. After 
visits by the head of the Russian military intelligence in Cairo and unprecedented meetings on 
the level of foreign and defence ministers in the autumn/winter of 2013/2014, and the setting 
up of a Russian-Egyptian commission on trade and economic cooperation in late March 2014, 
el-Sisi in August 2014 chose Moscow, and not Washington, for his first visit outside the 
region.  Even though foreign minister Lavrov, defence minister Shoigu and eventually 
president Putin, were deeply concerned about the Muslim Brotherhood’s temporary rise to 
power and had refused to approve of an Egyptian loan request over US$2 billion during 
Morsi’s reign, were quick in making unconditional cooperation offers, hoping for a quick 
revival of the close ties that existed during Soviet times in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, talks 
were successful as an agreement was reached in principle over the supply of MIG-29 fighter 
jets, Ka-25 and Mi-28 attack helicopters, and Kornet anti-tank missile systems. Russia has 
repeatedly supplied the latter to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, and which amount to 
roughly US$3 billion. In spite of Saudi Arabia’s opposition to opposes Russia’s Syria policy, 
it has been financing the arms deal. It also reached further agreement with respect to the 
initiation of close cooperation in the field of anti-terrorism supposedly targeting militant 
Islamists, joint military exercises, training Egyptian officers at Russian military academies, 
the fight against piracy, and Russian support for Egypt’s nuclear energy ambitions. Moreover, 
Putin himself ensured that Gazprom will deliver throughout 2015 several shipments of gas, 
based on a rate below market prices and to be paid at a later stage. He also convinced el-Sisi 
to enter into negotiations with the Eurasia Customs Union and to set up a Russian industrial 
zone in the context of the envisaged Suez Canal project. So far at least, these unconditional 
offers paid off for Moscow. The Egyptian regime committed itself to increase considerably its 
agricultural exports to Russia, thus helping the latter to bypass western sanctions imposed on 
Russia as a consequence of its unlawful actions in eastern Ukraine. Finally Egypt refrained 
from voting on a resolution in the UN General Assembly calling on all UN member states to 
not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea. 
 
Tunisia – relational upswing or convergence of needs? 
Generally speaking, similar dynamics are discernible as far as recent developments in 
Russia’s relations with Tunisia are concerned. The outbreak of the Jasmine revolution in 
January 2011, the fall of Ben Ali’s autocratic regime and, subsequently, En-Nahda’s decision 
to relinquish power in late 2013/early 2014, changed Russian-Tunisian dynamics. Since 
autumn 2013 it has generated a momentum that, has culminated in the conclusion of a trade 
agreement, stipulating an increase of Tunisian agricultural exports to compensate for Russian 
import gaps as a result of western sanctions as well as a general agreement to cooperate 
closely in the fight against terrorism, and a Russian grant over US$500 million. Even though 
the recent upswing in Russian-Tunisian relations indicates a break with the past, it does not 
necessarily imply a major foreign policy shift towards the relevant other by either side. 
Instead, it is the consequence of a temporary convergence of needs. On the one hand, Russia 
is desperate to find alternative trade partners to minimize the effects of western sanctions. On 
the other hand, the intensification of relations with Russia is simply a matter of economic and 
financial necessity for Tunisia, given the country’s socio-economic situation in the current 
climate of transition. Yet, these efforts are under no circumstances intended to undermine 
Tunisia’s close links with the EU and, to a lesser extent, the US. 
 
Morocco – strategic partnership or temporary partnership of convenience?  
Like Tunisia, Morocco still relies extensively on France, the EU and the US as regards its 
political, economic and financial support. Notwithstanding, the royal palace has already on 
several occasions in the past used the prospect of a potential deepening of ties with the Soviet 
Union/Russia as a bargaining chip to extract more concessions and benefits. It is in this light 
that current efforts by the Moroccan and Russian regime to expand their bilateral cooperation 
have to be understood. Thus, the Kremlin’s overtures, particularly visible since the outbreak 
of the Ukrainian crisis, vis-à-vis what it considers to be a strategic partner – Morocco is 
Russia’s most important phosphate supplier and shares similar views on issues related to non-
interventionism and self-determination in general – have been received positively by Rabat. 
This is the case also because its relations privilégiées with France are currently in a state of 
crisis and as recent attempts by the US and others to expand the United Nations Mission for 
the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) mandate beyond merely supervising the 
referendum for the possible separation of Western Africa from Morocco. Another aspect of 
the US’ strategy has involved   adding a human rights compliance element have served as an 
unwelcome reminder that western, rather pro-Moroccan perspectives on the future of Western 
Sahara might be subject to change. Against this backdrop Russia’s ad-hoc engagement is 
characterized mainly by the initiation of high-level foreign ministers meetings. The fifth 
meeting of a joint commission took place in September 2014 and was tasked to identify new 
areas for cooperation, meetings of high-ranking military personnel, and the Russian-
Moroccan summit to be held in Moscow in October 2014. These diplomatic activities follow a 
period in 2011-2013 during which Russia acted more as a bystander, supporting rhetorically 
the royal palace’s approach to the demands of the 20 February Movement. To date, this 
activism has resulted in the conclusion of several agreements, allowing Russia to export 
wheat – a commodity that until the outbreak of the war in Ukraine was supplied in 
considerable amounts by Kyiv –, and to increase imports of Moroccan agricultural produce. 
From the Kremlin’s perspective this shall be complemented by the timely conclusion of oil 
and gas contracts and, equally important, arms supplies, the latter of which, if they ever 
materialized, have the potential to break Morocco’s dependence on European and US-
American weaponry imports.  
 
Algeria – back to the future? 
In contrast, Russian efforts to revitalize relations with Algeria, during the Cold War one of the 
Soviet Union’s closest allies on the African continent, already date back to 2001 when Putin 
and president Bouteflika signed a strategic partnership agreement. On the one hand it aimed at 
facilitating the resumption of Russian arms deliveries and the exploration of joint cooperation 
initiatives in the hydrocarbon sector. On the other hand it was supposed to provide the 
Algerian regime with much needed international legitimacy after years of violent conflict. In 
fact, as far as military cooperation is concerned, Russia, which is occasionally training 
Algerian counterterrorist forces, has managed to increase considerably its arms supplies to 
Algeria. If between the early 1960s to the late 1980s, Algeria imported already almost 80% of 
its equipment from Russia, between 2003 and 2012 Rosoboronexport and the Russian military 
complex increased sales by more than 10%, making Algeria the third most important 
customer of Russian weapons. In the hydrocarbon sector, however, and in spite of the 
conclusion of a memorandum of understanding between Gazprom, Lukoil and the Algerian 
government-owned company Sonatrach in 2006 to collaborate in the area of liquefied natural 
gas and oil fields exploration, and the decision by Sonatrach in December 2008 to grant 
Gazprom exploration and exploitation rights in the El Assel field, Russia’s presence was 
rather limited. This changed only in February 2014 when Sonatrach and thus the Algerian 
regime invited Gazprom to participate in an international tender for the exploration and 
development of 30 fields that make up one fifth of Algeria’s territory. While this invitation is 
the outcome of eight years of bilateral negotiations, it has to be seen mainly in light of 
Algeria’s urgent need to explore new hydrocarbon deposits, not least in view of its rising 
domestic energy consumption, and as a reward of sorts for the Kremlin’s support of the 
regime throughout Arab uprisings in 2011 and its supposedly unconditional cooperation 
offers. Conversely, Putin used this new dynamic and, being aware of Algeria’s intentions to 
build a nuclear power plant by 2025, offered also close and preferential cooperation in the 
nuclear energy field – a development that in early September 2014 led to the conclusion of a 
bilateral agreement between Rosatom, Russia’s state agency in charge of nuclear energy 
cooperation, and the Algerian ministry of energy, stipulating the construction, operation and 
servicing of nuclear power stations and research reactors all across Algeria. 
 
Conclusions 
The current intensification of diplomatic relations and expansion of cooperation between 
Russia and North African countries has become possible because a growing number of 
regimes in the region are seeking opportunities to minimize growing uncertainty among 
western actors over the prospects of post-Arab Spring developments. As a result, their logics 
of action are rooted in the belief that a possible rapprochement with Russia can be used as a 
bargaining chip vis-à-vis the US and EU member states, as well as a mechanism destined to 
generate economic and financial gains. Under the impression of western sanctions and the 
prospect of international isolation, Russia has become increasingly aware of these 
considerations and, particularly since mid-, late-2013 is trying to transform them into mutual 
win-sets, even though, as is the case in Russia-Algeria relations, it sometimes follows just past 
practices or acts merely as a responsive rather than a pro-active actor. However, this is bound 
to change if the current rift between Russia and the West deepens. This possibility is reflected 
in the new security doctrine that defence minister Shoigu and Russian generals presented to 
high ranking military representatives from Algeria, Egypt, Libya and 38 other countries in late 
May 2014 and that regards the US as a dangerous nation seeking to dismantle Russian 
statehood and destabilize governments around the world. In other words, there is a high 
probability that Russia will increasingly seek to position itself in North Africa and beyond as 
an alternative to the West. However, the extent to which such an approach can succeed 
depends to a considerable degree on Arab regimes’ dependence on the US and the EU, as well 
as on their individual bargaining power. While Egypt seems to be the most likely to continue 
to snub Washington, others, such as Tunisia and Morocco, will try to balance and seek to 
consolidate their close relations with both Russia, the EU and the US in order to increase their 
individual room for manoeuvre and to respond pre-emptively to the US’s relative retreat from 
the Middle East and North Africa in general. To benefit from such dynamics as much as 
possible, however, it seems to be vital for the many actors involved in Russia’s foreign policy 
to define and agree on an overarching set of interest as far as North Africa is concerned and 
then devise an approach that is based on differentiation and country specificities. However, 
given the rather ad-hoc nature of Russian foreign policy making and the rather evolving and 
open-ended developments in the region itself this is not likely to happen any time soon.  
 
